OCSP - Online Certificate Status Protocol
Web client submits a request to a CA server, that returns a signed response with certificate current status.
But the problem with OCSP is,
- OCSP query between client and CA servers during TLS handshake increases latency.
- Relies on CA infrastructure making it prone to availability problems.
- Privacy compromise. Browser leaks what website is being accessed and who accesses it to CA servers.
- Tremendous load on CA servers to respond to gazillions of OCSP requests.

- OCSP is supported by pretty much all the web browsers except google chrome.
OCSP SOFT FAIL
- Failure to receive OCSP response doesn’t mean certificate is invalid, it is just that CA is unreachable / unresponsive.
- Most browsers simply treat the certificate as valid in this case. This is called “ Soft Fail “
- Google Chrome does not support OCSP but instead implements its own revocation-checking mechanism. This is called as CRLSets Mechanism.
OCSP STAPLING
- Normal OCSP protocol requires web client to directly query the certificate authority ( Using OCSP ) for status of website certificate.
- OCSP stapling moves this responsibility to the web server itself.
- Web server will periodically poll CA ( via OCSP ) for revocation status of its own certificate.
- web server will “ staple “ this OCSP response along with certificate to the client during TLS handshake in a “ server certificate status “ message.
- In this way , the CA will not know when a client is visiting any particular website.
DOWNSIDES OF OCSP-STAPLING
- It is not mandatory , and clients don’t know when to expect it.
- When cert is received without an OCSP stable, web-client proceeds to using normal OCSP ( if anything at all ) to verify revocation status.
OCSP STAPLE CAPTURE USING WIRESHARK